to implement, the attempts have causes considerable material and human cost. Meanwhile, financing for agricultural development has centred on the privatization and collateralization of land, through the revision of the land law and roll out of the Sustenta programme. It is too early to know what the outcome of this process will be. Many civil society organizations fear it will benefit only an elite few and ultimately lead to widespread dispossession. However, some hope that it will also provide much needed access to credit. While some civil society organizations have boycotted the initiatives altogether, others hope to be able to influence the programmes from the inside. It is important to recognize that the Mozambican government has not been a passive recipient of World Bank conditionalities. At different moments it has adopted, resisted, appropriated and even ignored proposed conditionalities. Their ability to so has hinged on their relative power and political interests. Notably, the Frelimo government has long instrumentalized loans and grants to support its distributional regime at the local level and ensure its political survival. Funds like Sustenta, enable the government to pay off loyal supporters ahead of local and general elections. Of course, the acquisition of public debt can prove unsustainable, if resources are simply siphoned off for unproductive activities, as was the case with the illicit government- 33 backed loans. And indeed, Mozambique’s debt stock is expected to continue to rise, as the country struggles to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. Ultimately, the Covid-19 pandemic has strengthened the hand of IFIs and it is unlikely that they will lose their relevance anytime soon. Both case studies point to the need for greater articulation between social movements – whether stemming from the home, the countryside, the street corner, or the factory floor – to shape the terms of financing. International financial institutions must be held to account, not only on the basis of cost-efficiency and effectiveness, but also on the basis of ethics and politically progressive imaginaries that place people over profit. Many World Bank projects have failed on their own terms, as well as in the eyes of those they purport to be assisting. However, developing countries end up having to foot the bill while international financial institutions wash their hands of the matter altogether. As Raffer (2004) argues, “External financial agencies have never shared financial consequences of [their] genuine mistakes and misfortunes” (p. 64) and “all IFIs claim the privilege of absolute immunity from any financial responsibility for their own actions, decisions, and omissions” (p. 65). International financial institutions must share financial responsibility for ineffective and inefficient interventions. Fast-tracking Financialization - International Financial Institutions’ Responses to the Covid-19 Pandemic in Mozambique