Snapshot review of Two World Bank COVID-19 Health support programs in Egypt
6-7 months after the Egyptian loan. This time variance makes comparison unviable, as the former
can be considered to be in the pilot phase.
As shown in the chart, the Yemeni and Jordanian loans were both approved at a marginal one
month before the Egyptian loan and have made palpably more progress.
Yemen could be classified as the most successful in loan progress, which is dubious given the
context of ongoing armed conflict in the country causing frequent blockades, and difficulties in
procurement. With no disclosed procurement plans, it is unclear how this exceptional progress
was possible given how precarious the current situation is. A closer look at the ISR shows that
PDO end targets were significantly smaller than any goal set by any other country. For example,
they have 6 out of 8 labs designated for COVID-19 detection, and the end target for health workers
trained in infection prevention and control per WHO protocol is set at only 2,000, in a country with
a population of approximately 29 million. This shows that these significantly higher
numbers/percentages are inflated when compared to their counterparts.
Of the MENA countries that showcase progress, Jordan has 20% progress in implementation and
30% disbursement. Notably, the Jordanian loan was approved approximately 1 month before the
Egyptian loan. Two months later, another COVID-19 loan (not targeting the health sector, but
social welfare) worth 350M USD was approved for Jordan25. The MENA region exceptions, with
seemingly better progress, are Palestine (identified as the “West Bank + Gaza” on the World Bank
website) and Djibouti. The former has 50% disbursement of the loan and 100% progress, denoted
by progress made in all objectives despite lack of completion. Whilst the latter, has had 52% of
the loan disbursed and 57% progress in PDO implementation. Notably, these countries had
significantly smaller loans than the rest of the MENA countries, both standing at 5m USD.
Moreover, there is significantly larger document availability, with the former having 5 procurement
plans and 2 ISRs; and the latter having 3 procurement plans and 2 ISRs. Both were approved
approximately one month before the Egyptian loan. Considering the smaller loan amount, as well
as the lack of other sources of funding (unlike Egypt), they are more likely to request disbursement
and follow through with the loan. Djibouti, for example, only has one other source of funding, the
IMF, which is not only designated for COVID-19 response but for debt relief26.
Conversely, Iran has 100% disbursement but 0% progress in implementation. Given US and
NATO sanctions towards Iran, it is within reason that they have requested exponential
disbursement. On the other hand, Tunisia has 100% of the loan disbursed with 25% progress,
the 25% account for one implemented objective which only has 3% progress. Similarly, Tunisia
25
“World Bank Project : Jordan Emergency Cash Transfer COVID-19 Response Project - P173974.”
World Bank. World Bank. Accessed March 1, 2021. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projectsoperations/project-detail/P173974.
26
“IMF Executive Board Approves a US$ 43.4 Million Disbursement to Djibouti Under the Rapid Credit
Facility and Debt Relief Under the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust to Address the COVID-19
Pandemic,” May 8, 2020. International Monetary Fund.
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/05/08/pr20211-djibouti-imf-executive-board-approvesdisbursement-under-the-rcf-to-address-covid-19.
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