Snapshot review of Two World Bank COVID-19 Health support programs in Egypt Conclusion and Recommendations Egypt secured extensive funding for COVID-19. The highest was a 2.772 billion USD loan. The access to these funds, many of which outline a broad criteria, could be the reason why Egypt is comparatively lagging behind in the implementation of the loan objectives. Moreover, they might have needed to make a disbursement request with other, more flexible funds at their disposal, since funds from the World Bank have to closely adhere to an outlined plan, containing several components. This is plausible especially given the fact that parliamentary approval as early as July 2020. Hence, Egypt lagging behind in the MENA comparative analysis. This is also despite the fact that the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation published the World Bank Project as part of its “Projects in Action”, with the project on the forefront of many other funds secured for the COVID-19 response. Moreover, there is a complete lack of information on the activation of the CERC within the “Transforming Egypt’s Healthcare” project, with no relevant valuable status and results reports or press releases beyond its activation. The methodological difficulty in conducting this study, the lack of access to sufficient information, especially in tracking activities in relation to the Bank’s funding, is a hindrance to stakeholder engagement as a whole. Without being able to track the activities, proper identification of stakeholders for field analysis becomes malignant. It poses a hindrance to those who are affected and want to make use of a GRM system, as well as for civil society in holding Bank projects accountable to communities. Above that, the SEP was stated as a preliminary version without any further updates. The listed stakeholders within the preparation/consultation phase of the SEP were all government bodies, following an ongoing pattern identified by BIC in their 2013 report “Impact of World Bank Policy and Programs on the Built Environment in Egypt” when it comes to the bank’s stakeholder identification lacking civil body representation. Most stakeholders are representatives of higher governance institutions. The lack of document disclosure makes it difficult for stakeholders to discern how the project is affecting their community. If stakeholders do not know how to trace the project’s activities, they will not be able to address their adversities in tangent with the GRM system in place. This is doubly compounded by the dilution of the project’s activities due to the other sources of funding, making it difficult for stakeholders to hold the World Bank accountable. No matter how well functioning the grievance system is, and no matter how many checks and balances are in place, if stakeholders are not able to identify World Bank projects, the system becomes inept. Furthermore, an added issue is the question of responsibility, when these documents are lacking, what system of checks and balances exist to ensure that country officers and project managers are clearly following through with World Bank guidelines and protocol? An additional exacerbating factor to these limitations is the reliance on the government GRM platforms which lack operational efficiency, especially with regards to accessibility. The grievance trial carried out shows how difficult it is to file the grievance initially via telephone. The alternative route requires an extensive amount of computer literacy, barring many from utilizing this tool. Furthermore, the SEP fails to outline the ways in which the World Bank assessed these GRMs and deemed them appropriate to incorporate into the project-level GRMs. 20