Conclusions The analysis of available data on state procurement funded by the Anti-Crisis Fund of Uzbekistan has shown the following trends in spending which could be considered indicators of corruption risks and should be investigated accordingly:  A significant part of the Fund was spent to support big state-owned companies and the construction of non-medical facilities despite the difficulties of the health care system in Uzbekistan. Clearly, the economic sector is heavily impacted by the pandemic in Uzbekistan, but emergency loans allocated by the MDBs to overcome COVID-19 should ensure a balance of priority health measures to save lives and economic measures to support business. Multiple reports confirmed that Uzbekistan’s healthcare system failed to protect people and provide the requested medical support.  Procurement by healthcare institutions in particular regions, including the city of Tashkent, significantly exceeded the potential demand based on population size. The total cost of personal protective equipment purchased in one region exceeded the national average by almost three times. The authorities of the regions with extremely poor health care systems asked for the highest number of purchases in the non-medical sector. There are almost no effective mechanisms of public control over the authorities in Uzbekistan, such as independent media and advanced civil society. Therefore, such patterns in public spending may indicate the potential misuse or embezzlement of the funds.  Three companies allegedly affiliated with the president of Uzbekistan and the mayor of Tashkent received the largest contracts for the construction of medical facilities. Similarly, ten companies out of 29 received the majority of the funds for the construction of non-medical facilities in Uzbekistan. One state enterprise received 84 per cent of the funding allocated for meal provision to the quarantine centres in Tashkent. In a situation where the companies were exempted from tenders, such patterns may call into question the objectivity and independence of the decisions made by the government in favour of these companies. Supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Eurasia Program of the Open Society Foundations. 9